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Abstract
We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (by Bergemann, Morris, and
Tercieux (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environ-
ment with lotteries and transfers. Di¤erent from previous papers, our approach pos-
sesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., nite mechanisms with no integer
game or modulo game are used; no transfer is imposed on any rationalizable prole;
the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations
and continuous in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
JEL Classication: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: Complete information, continuous implementation, implementation, infor-
mation perturbations, Maskin monotonicity*, rationalizability, social choice function.
1 Introduction
The design of institution to be interacted among strategic agents has been an important
research agenda in economic theory. Suppose a society has decided on social choice rule a
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recipe for choosing the socially optimal alternatives on the basis of individualspreferences
over alternatives. To tackle the problem of how to implement the rule, Maskin (1999), in his
classic paper, (i) describes a decentralized decision making process as a mechanism, which
species the possible actions available to members of a society, as well as the outcomes of
these actions; and (ii) asks to what extent one can design a mechanism which makes its all
Nash equilibrium outcomes socially desirable. This is called Nash implementation. Maskin
proposes a well-known monotonicity condition, which we refer to as Maskin monotonicity,
and shows it to be necessary and almost su¢ cient for Nash implementation.
The main purpose of our paper is to characterize the class of social choice functions
(henceforth, SCFs) that are exactly implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite
mechanism. Rationalizable strategies are dened as the set of strategies that survive the
iterated elimination of never best responses. In nite mechanisms, as in this paper, ratio-
nalizable strategies are equivalent to the strategies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. Our mechanism excludes the integer game or modulo game
constructions which are prevalent in the literature but possess problematic features (see
Jackson (1992)).
In the environments where the designer can impose lottery allocation and transfer,
our Theorem 1 shows that an SCF is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite
mechanism if and only if it satises Maskin monotonicity. Maskin monotonicity is proposed
by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011) (henceforth, BMT) and stronger than Maskin
monotonicity.1 Theorem 1 handles the case of two agents as well as more than two agents;
moreover, no transfer is imposed on any rationalizable prole and the message space is small.
The su¢ ciency result of BMT, on the other hand, needs at least three agents and uses an
innite mechanism.2
We now highlight how this result provides new insights on classical as well as recent
results in the literature. First, Oury and Tercieux (2012) advocate for rationalizable imple-
1BMT show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation using
mechanisms satisfying what they call the best-response property (which include nite mechanisms).
2More recently, Xiong (2019) characterizes rationalizable implementation of social choice functions under
a weaker condition called Maskin monotonicity. Also Jain (2019) and Kunimoto and Serrano (2019)
investigate rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences. In contrast to our exercise, these
papers work with environments with no transfer and make use of innite implementing mechanisms with
integer games for their su¢ ciency results.
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mentation by nite mechanisms. They consider the following situation: the planner wants
not only that there is an equilibrium that implements the SCF but also that the same equi-
librium continues to implement the SCF in all the models close to her initial model. Hence,
the SCF is continuously implementable. Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012) shows that
an SCF is continuously implementable by a nite mechanism if it is exactly implementable in
rationalizable strategies by a nite mechanism.3 What has been unknown are the conditions
for exact implementation in rationalizable strategies by a nite mechanism. Our Theorem 1
addresses this important open issue.4
Second, we also discuss rationalizable implementation when the SCF is responsive. A
responsive SCF assigns distinct outcomes to di¤erent states. BMT observe that when the
SCF is responsive, Maskin monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity. We show that,
for any SCF f , we can construct an SCF f " that is "-close to f such that f " is responsive and
satises Maskin monotonicity. This is summarized as our Corollary 2: anySCF is virtually
implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite mechanism, which is rst proved by
Abreu and Matsushima (1992) in the case with three or more agents. Finally, we construct
an example in which some Maskin monotonic SCF cannot be implemented in rationalizable
strategies by any direct mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic setup
and denitions. In Section 3, we adopt rationalizability and identify Maskin monotonicity as
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for rationalizable implementation by a nite mechanism.
As concluding remarks, Section 4 discusses a number of extensions of our main result.
3Oury and Tercieux (2012) also prove the only if part of the result under a further assumption that
sending messages is slightly costly.
4However, our Theorem 1 has two caveats in relation to Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012): First, we
focus on complete information environments, whereas Oury and Tercieux (2012) deal with general incomplete
information environments. Second, we specialize in environments with lottery and transfer, whereas Oury




Consider a nite set of agents I = f1; 2; :::; Ig with I  2; a nite set of possible states ;
and a set of pure alternatives A. We consider an environment with lotteries and transfers.
Specically, we work with the space of allocations/outcomes X  (A)  RI where (A)
denotes the set of lotteries on A that have a countable support, and RI denotes the set of
transfers required from the agents.
Each state  2  induces for each agent i 2 I a type i. Each type i is associated
with a bounded expected utility function vi (; i) :  (A)! R, and conversely, each bounded
expected utility function identies at most one type. Let i denote the set of types/expected
utility functions of agent i which can be induced from . Assume that for any type i, there




we denote by ui (x; i) = vi(`; i) + ti the quasilinear utility function induced by i.
We focus on a complete information environment in which the state  is common
knowledge among the agents but unknown to a mechanism designer. Thanks to the complete-
information assumption, it is without loss of generality to assume that agentsvalues are
private. The designers objective is specied by a social choice function f :  ! (A),
namely, if the state is , the designer would like to implement the social outcome f () which
is allowed to be a lottery. We can also allow an SCF to be dened as a mapping from  to
X. In this case, our implementation requires that no additional transfers be imposed on any
rationalizable message prole beyond the transfers prescribed by the SCF.
2.2 Mechanism and Solution
AmechanismM is a triplet ((Mi); g; ( i))i2I whereMi is the nonempty nite set of messages
available to agent i; g :M ! X (M  Ii=1Mi) is the outcome function; and  i :M ! R is
the transfer rule which species the transfer to agent i. The environment and the mechanism
together constitute a game with complete information at each state  2  which we denote
by  (M; ).
In studying implementation in rationalizable strategies, we adopt the notion of corre-
lated rationalizability dened in Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) as a solution concept. We
4
dene rationalizability for the nite game   (M; ) as follows. Let S0i (M; ) = Mi, and we
dene Ski (M; ) inductively: for any k > 0, we set
Ski (M; ) =
8>><>>:mi 2Mi

there exists i 2 (M i) such that
(1) i (m i) > 0) mj 2 Sk 1j (M; ) for each j 6= i;
(2) mi 2 argmaxm0i2Mi i (m i)ui (g (m0i;m i) ; i) :
9>>=>>; :




i (M; ) is the set of rationalizable messages of agent i and
S1 (M; ) =Qi2I S1i (M; ) is the set of rationalizable message proles in   (M; ).
We abuse notation to identify l 2 (A) with xl = (l; 0; :::; 0) 2 X and the range of
social choice function, f(), as a subset of X. While we allow the outcome function g to
invoke transfers, the following implementation notion requires that for each rationalizable
prole m at state , the outcome g (m) is exactly the social outcome f () at state  with no
transfer. In other words, we require exact implementation.
Denition 1 An SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a
mechanismM = ((Mi); g; ( i))i2I such that for any  2 , (i) S1(M; ) 6= ?; and (ii) for
any m 2 S1(M; ), we have g (m) = f () and  i (m) = 0.
Remark: Since we propose a nite implementing mechanism below, S1 (M; ) is always
nonempty, namely, requirement (i) of rationalizable implementation is automatically satis-
ed.
2.2.1 Maskin Monotonicity
In this section, we introduce a central condition to our rationalizable implementation re-
sult, which is called Maskin monotonicity. In our environment with penalties, Maskin
monotonicity is equivalent to strict Maskin monotonicity proposed by BMT as a necessary
condition for rationalizable implementation using "well behaved" (such as nite) mecha-
nisms.
For (i; x) 2 i X, let
Li(x; i) = fy 2 X : ui(x; i)  ui(y; i)g
denote the lower-contour set at allocation x for type i of agent i. Let
Ui(x; i) = fy 2 X : ui(y; i)  ui(x; i)g
5
denote the upper-contour set at allocation x for type i of agent i. Replacing the weak
inequality with a strict one, we can dene SLi(x; i) and SU i(x; i) as the strict lower
and upper contour sets for type i of agent i, respectively. For a given SCF f , we let
Pf = fzgz2f() be the partition on  induced by f , i.e., z  f 2 j f() = zg. For each
partition P on , we denote by P () the atom in P which contains state  and by Pi ()
the projection of the set of type prole P () on i. Moreover, for each x 2 X, let




The following denition is obtained by adapting Denition 5 of BMT to our setup that
accommodates both lotteries and penalties.
Denition 2 Say an SCF f satises Maskin monotonicity if there exists a partition P
of  such that (i) P is at least as ne as Pf ; (ii) for any ~;  2 , whenever ~ 62 P (), there
exists i 2 I for whom
Li(f(~);P(~)) \ SU i(f(~); i) 6= ?: (1)
Although Maskin monotonicity implies Maskin monotonicity, it was not a priori clear
whether the two conditions are di¤erent. Jain (2019) constructs an example showing that
Maskin monotonicity is strictly stronger than Maskin monotonicity. In Appendix A.1, we
modify the example of Jain (2019) to make the same point in our setup, which accommodates
the case with two agents, lotteries, and transfers. Accordingly, rationalizable implementation
is strictly more restrictive than Nash implementation, when we focus on nite mechanisms
and allow for lotteries and transfers.5
2.2.2 Challenge Scheme
Let P be the partition in the denition of Maskin monotonicity. First, a challenge scheme
for an SCF f is a set of allocations fx(~; i)g, one for each pair of state ~ and type i of
agent i, such that
if Li(f(~);P(~)) \ SU i(f(~); i) 6= ?, then x(~; i) 2 Li(f(~);P(~)) \ SU i(f(~); i);
if Li(f(~);P(~)) \ SU i(f(~); i) = ?, then x(~; i) = f(~),
5In Chen, Kunimoto, Sun, and Xiong (2020), we prove that Maskin monotonicity fully characterizes
mixed-strategy Nash implementation using nite mechanisms in the same setup.
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where we omit the reference to P in x(; ) to simplify the notation. We call x(~; i) a test
allocation when x(~; i) 2 Li(f(~);P(~)) \ SU i(f(~); i) and in such a case, agent i called a
whistle-blower for ~ at state .
The following lemma shows that there is a challenge scheme under which truth-telling
induces the best allocation.
Lemma 1 There is a challenge scheme fx(~; i)g for an SCF f such that for any state ~
and type i,
ui(x(~; i); i)  ui(x(~; 0i); i),80i 2 i. (2)
Proof. Fix an arbitrary challenge scheme fx(~; i)g for an SCF f . For each state ~ and each
type i, we can redene x(~; i) as the most preferred allocation of type i in the (nite)
menu of allocations fx(~; 0i) : 0i 2 ig. It is straightforward to show that x(~; i) remains a
challenge scheme. Thus, we satisfy the following two properties: for each i 2 i and ~ 2 ,





and (ii) for any 
0
i 2 i, there exists 
000
i 2 i such that
ui(x(~; 
0
i); i) = ui(x(
~; 000i ); i):
Then, combining the two equation above, we get
ui(x(~; i); i)  ui(x(~; 0i); i); 80i 2 i.
This completes the proof.
In the following, we shall invoke a challenge scheme which satises (2) and we call it
the best challenge scheme.
2.2.3 Dictator Lottery
Let ~X  A[Si2I;i2i;~2 x(~; i) where each a 2 A is identied with xa = (a; 0; :::; 0) 2 X.
Since vi(; i) is bounded and  is nite, we choose 0 > 0 as an upper bound on the monetary
value of a change in the selection of an alternative in ~A; that is,
0 > sup
i2I;i2i;x;x02 ~A
jui(x; i)  ui(x0; i)j ; (3)
Now, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 For each agent i 2 I, there exists a function yi : i [ ! X such that yi() =
f() for each ; and for every type i and every 
0
i 6= i, we have
ui (yi (i) ; i) > ui (yi (
0
i) ; i) ; ; (4)
moreover, for each j 2 I and 0j, we also have for every x 2 ~X,
uj(yj(
0
j); j) < uj(x; j). (5)
From Abreu and Matsushima (1992) we can prove the existence of lotteries fy0i ()g 
(A) which satisfy Condition (4). To satisfy Condition (5), we simply add a penalty of 0
to each outcome of the lotteries fy0i (i)gi2i. More precisely, for each i 2 i, we set
yi(i) = (y
0
i(i); 0; : : : ; 0) 2 X
We call the resulting lotteries the dictator lotteries for agent i and denote them by fyi ()g.
3 Rationalizable Implementation
We now state our main result on rationalizable implementation.
Theorem 1 An SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite mechanism
if and only if it satises Maskin monotonicity.
Since a nite mechanism satises the best response property dened in BMT (see Def-
inition 6 of BMT), the only ifpart of Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 3 of BMT. In












 2M1i M2i M3i =Mi = (i [):
That is, agent i is asked to make (1) an announcement of either his own type or the state
(which we denote by m1i ); and (2) another two announcements of the state (which we denote





Let P be the partition in the denition of Maskin monotonicity. Say two states  and 0
are equivalent (denoted as   0) if they belong to the same atom of P. Given a message
prole m, we say that m is consistent if there exists ~ 2  such that
m1i  m2i  m3i  ~ for every i 2 I. (6)
That is, consistency requires that every agent i announces three states m1i ;m
2
i and
m3i from the same atom of P. Alternatively, we also say that m is consistent on ~. Note
that m is inconsistent whenever m1i 2 i for some agent i: We extend x : i ! X to x
:  (i [ ) ! X such that x(; ~) = f() for any pair of states (; ~) 2 2. For every
agent i 2 I, we say that agent i challenges his own report if x (m3i ;m1i ) 6= f (m3i ) ; and agent
i does not challenge his own report if x (m3i ;m
1
i ) = f (m
3
i ) :










 (1  e (m))x  m3i ;m1i 
where yk : i [! X is the dictator lottery for agent k dened in Lemma 2; moreover, we
dene
e(m) =
8<: 0, if m is consistent;", otherwise.
That is, the designer rst chooses an agent, with equal probability, to be checked. In checking
agent i, the designer will use agent is rst report to check is third report in determining
the allocation.
After the designer picked agent i to be checked, the outcome function distinguishes





 (1  ") x  m3i ;m1i  :
That is, with probability ", we implement the lottery yi (m1i ) and with probability 1  ", we
implement the lottery x(m3i ;m
1
i ).
We elaborate on the way we choose " together with other parameters after we introduce
the transfer rule as follows.
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3.1.3 Transfer Rule:
In order to dene the transfer rule, we introduce a few pieces of notation. For each message
prole m, let I0 (m1)  j 2 I : m1j 2 	 be the set of agents who report a state in their






if I0 (m1) = ? and m1 = (0i)i2I for some 0 2 ;
if I0 (m1) 6= ? and m1j = 00 for all j 2 I0 (m1) ;
otherwise.
We may interpret ^(m1) as a state identiedby the rst announcement prole (m1i )i2I .
In the rst two cases, such an identication is clear: either every one report a type in
their rst announcement and the joint type prole can be induced from a single state 0
or some agent(s) announce a state in their rst announcement and these agents reach an
unanimous agreement in announcing a common state 00 (in which case we ignore the agents
who announce a type in their rst announcement, in this identication). When there is no
such a clear identication, we simply set ^(m1) equal to an arbitrarily pre-specied state 000.
Equipped with the denition of ^(m1), for any message prole m and any agent i, we
specify the transfer to agent i as follows:
 i(m) = 
1
i (m) + 
2




 1i (m) =
8<: 0, if m2i  ^(m1); 00, otherwise.
 2i (m) =




 3i (m) =
8<: 0  if m
1
i 2 i or [m1i 2 , m1i  m2j  m3j , and x(m1i ;m1j) = f(m1i );8j 2 I];
otherwise.
In words,  1i (m) and 
2
i (m) ensure that once the type prole m





agent i will only want to announce states which are also equivalent to ~ when reporting
m2i and m
3
i . Specically, 
1
i (m) requires that agent i pay 
00 if his announcement m2i is not




which contains m1; likewise,  2i (m) requires that agent i pay
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 if his announcement m3i is not equivalent to agent (i + 1)s announcement m
2
i+1 where
I + 1  1. In addition,  3i (m) requires that agent i pay  if he announces a state in m1i
which is not equivalent to some other agents second and third announcements of state; or
agent is announced state is challenged by some other agent.
3.1.4 Choice of parameters
Since  is nite, we can nd d > 0 such that for any i 2 I and any pair of types i; 0i 2 i
with i 6= 0i, the dictator lotteries satisfy
ui (yi (i) ; i) > ui (yi (
0
i) ; i) + d: (7)
By (3), we can choose " > 0 and 00 > 0 su¢ ciently small and  > 0 su¢ cient large
such that the following three conditions hold:
 The penalty scale  dominates any incentive from a change in allocations in outcomes
g () together with the penalty 00 resulted from  1i , i.e.,
 > 00 + sup
i2I;i2i;m;m02M
jui(g (m) ; i)  ui(g (m0) ; i)j . (8)
 The penalty scale 00 and " do disturb the e¤ectivenessof agent is challenge. More
precisely, whenever agent i is checked, if he has reported a false state in m3i for which
he is a whistle-blower at the true state, it is still strictly better for him to tell the truth
in m1i to challenge m
3
i . That is,
x (m3i ;m
1









i )  ui(f(~);m1i )
i
  " > 00. (9)




d > 00. (10)
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We start by outlining the proof of Theorem 1. In this proof, we show in Step 1 that if the




i ) is rationalizable,
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then eitherm1i is the true type of agent i orm
1
i is a state which is equivalent to the true state.
As a result, ^(m1) must be equivalent to the true state. We emphasize that establishing Step
1 is the heart of the proof of our Theorem 1. In Step 2, the cross-checking penalties ensure
that each m2i and m
3
i is in the atom of P which contains the true state. Finally, in Step 3 we
conclude that if a message prole m is rationalizable, its resulting outcome coincides with
social outcome designated to the true state and no penalties are imposed. This completes
the proof.
Recall that the agents commonly know the true state of the world which is unknown
to the designer. Denote the true state by  2 . We now prove the ifpart of Theorem 1
in three steps.
Step 1: For every m 2 S1 (M; ), if m1i 2 i; then m1i = i; if m1i 2 ; then m1i  .





against which mi is a best reply. We prove Step 1 in each of the following
two substeps.
Step 1A. If m1i 2 i; then m1i = i:
Fix m i with i(m i) > 0. We show that for every mi 2 S1i (M; ) with m1i 2 i, we




i ), which is the same as mi except
that ~m1i = i 6= m1i . Note that for anym i 2 S1 i (M; ) we have e (mi;m i) = e ( ~mi;m i) =
" since both m1i and ~m
1
i are in i so that (mi;m i) and ( ~mi;m i) are not consistent. Thus,
in terms of allocation, the gain from choosing ~mi rather than mi is "Id when agent i is chosen
to be checked, and the potential loss in terms of transfers is bounded by 00 due to  1i (). It
follows from (10) that ~mi is a strictly better reply than mi. This is a contradiction.
Step 1B. If m1i 2 ; then m1i  :
Fixmi 2 S1i (M; ) withm1i 2 : Saym1i = ~:We rst show that there exists somem i
with i(m i) > 0 such that m1i  m2j  m3j and x(m1i ;m1j) = f(m1i ) for every agent j 2 I:
Suppose not. Then, by  3i (); agent i is penalized by : Consider ~mi = (i;m2i ;m3i ), which
is identical to mi except that ~m1i = i 6= ~ = m1i . The potential loss in terms of transfers
is bounded by 00 due to  1i (): The potential loss in terms of allocation from choosing ~mi
rather than mi is bounded by 1I ; while the gain due to 
3
i () from choosing ~mi rather than
mi is at least : By (8), ~mi = (i;m2i ;m
3
i ) is a strictly better reply against i than mi. This
contradicts to the hypothesis that mi 2 S1i (M; ).
Note that we have kept xing mi 2 S1i (M; ) with m1i = ~. In addition to this, we
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consider m i 2 S1 i (M; ) such that, 8k 2 I,
~  m2k  m3k;
and
x(~; k) = f(~).
Suppose on the contrary that ~ 6 . Then, since the SCF f satises Maskin monotonicity,
there exists some agent j 2 I for whom x(~; j) 6= f(~) and
uj(x(~; j); j) > uj(f(~); j): (11)








, which is the same as mj except that ~m1j = j. In the
following, we shall show that ~mj strictly dominates mj, which contradicts the hypothesis
that mj 2 S1j (M; ).
Fix ~m j 2 S1 j(M; ) arbitrarily. Observe rst that e( ~mj; ~m j) = " since ~m1j 2 j so
that ( ~mj; ~m j) is not consistent. Thus,









 (1  ")x   ~m3k; ~m1k 1I "yj( ~m1j) (1  ")x(m3j ; ~m1j) ;
where x(m3j ; ~m
1
j) = x(
~; j) 6= f(m3j). In contrast,






e (mj; ~m j) yk
 
~m1k





j). We now show that ~mj strictly dominates mj by considering the
following two subcases of js opponentsannouncement ~m j:
Case 2.1. e(mj; ~m j) = ".
In this case, we have









 (1  ")x   ~m3k; ~m1k 1I "yj  m1j (1  ") f(m3j) .
In this case, g ( ~mj; ~m j) di¤ers from g (mj; ~m j) only when agent j is chosen to be checked. In
terms of dictator lotteries, the loss of agent j from choosingmj to choosing ~mj is bounded by
1
I
"d; in terms of allocations from the best challenge scheme, the gain of agent j from choosing
mj to choosing ~mj is (1  ") 1I

uj(x(~; j); j)  uj(f(~); j)

; and in terms of transfers, the
loss of agent j from choosing mj to choosing ~mj is bounded by 00 (due to  1j): By (9), we
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conclude that agent j obtains a strictly higher expected utility under ~mj than mj against
~m j.
Case 2.2. e(mj; ~m j) = 0.










every k 6= j. Hence,
g (mj; ~m j) = f(~).
In contrast,














































Hence, it follows from (5) of Lemma 2 (or more precisely, the argument for how to construct
yi(i) right after Lemma 2) that the net gain from choosing ~mj rather than mj is at least
 " + (1  ") 1
I

uj(x(~; j); j)  uj(f(~); j)

> 0
where the strict inequality follows from (9). In addition, the loss of agent j from choosing
mj to choosing ~mj is bounded by 00 (due to  1j). By (9), we know that agent j obtains a
strictly higher expected utility under ~mj than mj against ~m j. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, the consideration of the above two cases concludes that ~mj strictly dominates
mj. This implies that m1i  .
Step 2: For every agent i 2 I and every mi 2 S1i (M; ), we have m2i  m3i  .
We rst show that m2i  : It follows from Step 1, for each mi 2 S1i (M; ) ; m1i = i
or m1i  : If m1i = i for each agent i 2 I, then in m1, we have a type prole induced by
the true state. Hence, for each m 2 S1i (M; ), we must have ^(m1)  . Suppose by way
of contradiction that m2i = 
0 6 : Note that by Step 1 for any m i 2 S1 i (M; ) ; (mi;m i)
is inconsistent. Now, we construct ~mi = (m1i ; ;m
3
i ) which is identical to mi except that
~m2i = . Thus, ( ~mi;m i) implements some allocation at least better than (mi;m i) since
mi and ~mi only di¤er in their second report: In terms of transfers incurred, the gain from
( ~mi;m i) is 00 from  1i (), while the loss from (mi;m i) is 00 from  1i (). Hence, ~mi is a
better reply than mi against any m i 2 S1 i (M; ). This is the desired contradiction.
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Then, we show that m3i  : By the previous argument, we know that in the second





i ; ) which is identical to mi except that ~m
3
i = . Note that ( ~mi;m i) and
(mi;m i) may implement di¤erent allocations, and in terms of transfer, the gain is  from
( ~mi;m i) rather than (mi;m i). Hence, we conclude that ~mi is a strictly better response
than mi against m i. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: For any agent i 2 I and any m 2 S1 (M; ), we have g (m) = f() and  i (m) = 0.
By Steps 1 and 2, for any m 2 S1 (M; ) ; we have that ^(m1)   and m2i  m3i  
for every agent i 2 I. We next show that for any m 2 S1 (M; ) ; m1i   for every
agent i: Suppose not. By Step 1, we know mi is such that m1i = i: Given an arbitrary












"yi(i) (1  ") f () : (12)
Consider ~mi = (;m2i ;m
3
i ) which is identical to mi except that m
1
i = : Then,











"f() (1  ") f () : (13)
By choosing ~mi rather thanmi; there is positive gain from (13) rather than (12) by (5); while
there is no loss since m2j  m3j   for every agent j 2 I: Hence, we have a contradiction.
We thus conclude that for every m 2 S1(M; ), we have e (m) = 0 so that no transfer
is invoked and f() is implemented. This completes the proof of Step 3.
4 Discussion
We conclude this paper by making a few discussions that allow us to locate our contribution
in the literature. First, we relate our result to continuous implementation of Oury and
Tercieux (2012). Second, we discuss how responsiveness makes our result simpler and tightly
connected to virtual implementation of Abreu andMatsushima (1992). Finally, we argue that
it is generally impossible to simplify our implementing mechanism into a direct mechanism
where every agent only announces a state.
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4.1 Continuous Implementation
Oury and Tercieux (2012) consider the following situation: the planner wants not only that
there is an equilibrium that implements the SCF but also that the same equilibrium continues
to achieve implementation of the SCF in all the models close to his initial model. Hence,
the SCF is continuously implementable. Oury and Tercieux (2012) obtain the following
characterization of continuous implementation in their Theorem 4: an SCF is continuously
implementable by a nite mechanism if it is exactly implementable in rationalizable strategies
by a nite mechanism.6 Since this result says nothing about the class of SCFs that are exactly
implementable in rationalizable strategies by nite mechanisms, we view this as an important
open question in the literature. We establish the following continuous implementation result
which is a direct consequence of our Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Proposition 1 If an SCF satises Maskin monotonicity, it is continuously implementable
by a nite mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, our Proposition 1 is the rst result which continuously
implements all Maskin monotonic SCFs by a nite mechanism. The identied condition,
Maskin monotonicity, is strictly stronger than Maskin monotonicity, as we will show in
Appendix A.1. However, two caveats remain in relating Proposition 1 to Theorem 4 of Oury
and Tercieux (2012). The rst caveat is that we focus on complete information environments,
whereas Oury and Tercieux deal with incomplete information environments where the base-
line model can be an arbitrary nite type space. The second caveat is that we specialize in
environments with lottery and transfer, whereas Oury and Tercieux impose no condition on
the environments.
In incomplete information environments with lottery and transfer, Chen, Kunimoto,
and Sun (2019) made some progress in this direction. They show that any incentive compat-
ible SCF is continuously implementable by a nite mechanism, provided that (i) we allow
for arbitrarily small ex post penalties both on the equilibrium and o¤ the equilibrium; (ii)
each agent knows his own payo¤ type; and (iii) agentsbeliefs satisfy a generic correlation
6In fact, assuming that sending messages is slightly costly, Oury and Tercieux also prove the converse:
an SCF is continuously implementable by a nite mechanism only if it is rationalizably implementable by a
nite mechanism.
16
condition. In other words, under the three assumptions above, incentive compatibility is the
only constraint for continuous implementation.
4.2 Responsive SCFs
Here we draw a connection between our result and the virtual implementation result proved
by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). To do so, consider the following condition on SCF intro-
duced by BMT:
Denition 3 An SCF f is responsive if, for any pair of states ; 0 2 , f() = f(0) )
 = 0.
Responsiveness requires that the SCF responds to a change in the state with a
change in the social choice outcome. Observe that a responsive SCF that satises Maskin
monotonicity must satisfy Maskin monotonicity. Indeed, since Pf is the nest partition on
, for any two states  and 0, 0 2 P() is equivalent to 0 = .
In the case of responsive SCFs, Maskin monotonicity, which is a necessary condition
for rationalizable implementation, reduces to Maskin monotonicity. We formalize this result
whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 3 If an SCF f is responsive and satises Maskin monotonicity, it also satises
Maskin monotonicity.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 imply the following corollary for the case of responsive SCFs.
Corollary 1 Any responsive SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite
mechanism if and only if it satises Maskin monotonicity.
Note that the only if" part of Corollary 1 follows fromBMT. BMT prove that under the
no-worst alternative condition (See Denition 4 of BMT, p. 1259)7, if there are at least three
agents, f is responsive, and satises strict Maskin monotonicity, then it is implementable in
rationalizable strategies by an innite mechanism. In contrast, Corollary 1 covers the case
of two agents.
7No-worst alternative requires that any social outcome cannot be the worst outcome in any state. In our
setup with transfers, no-worst alternative is automatically satised.
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In what follows, we argue that the responsiveness of SCFs is tightly connected to the
permissive result on virtual implementation due to Abreu and Matsushima (1992). Speci-
cally, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show that when there are at least three agents, any SCF
is virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite mechanism. An SCF f is
said to be virtually implementable if, for any " 2 (0; 1), the SCF f is exactly implementable
with probability 1  ". Fix an SCF f arbitrarily and let " 2 (0; 1), which will be xed later.
Dene f " : ! (A) as follows: for any  2 ,
f "() = "yi(i) + (1  ")f();
where yi(i) is the dictator lottery for type i, as constructed in Lemma 2. Moreover, by
adding small penalties to the dictator lotteries, we can make yi(i) 6= yi(0i) whenever  6= 0,
without a¤ecting the conclusion of Lemma 2 (i.e., (14) below). Therefore, f "() 6= f "(0)
whenever  6= 0. In other words, we can make f " responsive. We now argue that f " is also
Maskin monotonic. Fix two states  and 0 with  6= 0 (and hence f "() 6= f "(0)). Since
 6= 0 and due to the construction of dictator lotteries, there must exist agent i for whom
ui(yi(i); i) > ui(yi(
0




i) > ui(yi(i); 
0
i). (14)
We construct the following lottery x(0; i) 2 X:
x(0; i)  "yi(i) + (1  ")f(0):
That is, x(0; i) is constructed by replacing yi(
0
i) in f (
0) with yi(i). By (14), we have
x(0; i) 2 Li (f " (0) ; 0i) \ SU i (f " (0) ; i) .
This shows that f " satises Maskin monotonicity. By Theorem 1, we provide the following
result without proof.
Corollary 2 Any SCF f is virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies by a nite
mechanism.
Recall that our mechanism is di¤erent from that of Abreu and Matsushima (1992),
who do not use penalties but rather introduce a domain restriction in the lottery space. The
domain restriction in Abreu and Matsushima (1992) requires that for every agent i and state
, there exist a pair of lotteries which are strictly ranked for agent i and for which other
agents have the (weakly) opposite ranking.
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4.3 Direct Mechanism
The message in our implementing mechanism is remarkably parsimonious. To recap, each
agent is only asked to announce a type or state together with another two states. As in our
setup di¤erent types corresponds to di¤erent cardinal preferences over lottery allocations, we
only ask the agents to announce payo¤-relevant information, free of using integer/modulo
games. With the feature in mind, we may still investigate to what extent we could simplify
the mechanism further.
A prominent benchmark is to ask whether we could actually achieve rationalizable
implementation for any Maskin monotonic SCF via some direct mechanism. In our setup,
a direct mechanism is a mechanism ((Mi); g; ( i))i2I in which (i) agents are asked to report
the state (i.e., Mi =  for every agent i), and (ii) a unanimous report leads to the social
outcome with no transfers (i.e., g (; :::; ) = f () and  i () = 0 for every agent i and for
each state ). In Appendix A.2, we construct an SCF which satises Maskin monotonicity;
hence, by Theorem 1, it is implementable in rationalizable strategies. Moreover, we show
that the SCF cannot be implemented in rationalizable strategies in a direct mechanism.
A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
A.1 Maskin Monotonicity and Maskin Monotonicity
We rst recap the denition of Maskin monotonicity.
Denition 4 An SCF f satises Maskin monotonicity if, for any pair of states ~ and 
with f(~) 6= f (), there is some agent i 2 I such that
Li(f(~); ~i) \ SU i(f(~); i) 6= ?. (15)
The following example shows that Maskin monotonicity is strictly stronger than
Maskin monotonicity.
Example 1 Let A = fa; b; c; dg ; I = f1; 2g ; X = (A)  R2, and  = f; ; ; g :
The agentsutility functions are given in the two tables below. Consider the following SCF
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f () = f () = f () = (a; 0; 0) 2 X and f () = (b; 0; 0) 2 X: For simplicity of notation,
we write a 2 A for (a; 0; 0) 2 X and b 2 A for (b; 0; 0) 2 X, each of which is a degenerate
allocation with no transfer to any agent.
v1    
a 3 2 2 2
b 2 3 1 3
c 1 1 3 1
d 0 0 0 0
v2    
a 3 2 2 2
b 1 0 1 1
c 2 1 3 3
d 0 3 0 0
In the following three claims below, we show that the SCF is Maskin monotonic, but
it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
Claim 1 For every agent i 2 I and  2 , Li (a; )  Li (a; ).
Proof. Observe that for any agent i 2 I, any ~a 2 An fag, and any  2 ; the utility
di¤erence between a and ~a is weakly larger at  than that at . That is,
vi (a; )  vi (~a; )  vi (a; )  vi (~a; ) .
Hence, for any x 2 X, i 2 I, and  2 , we have ui(a; )  ui (x; ) whenever ui(a; ) 
ui(x; ).
Claim 2 The SCF f violates Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary partition P ner than Pf = ff; ; g ; fgg : Note that
P () = fg for any partition P ner than Pf :
Case 1.  2 P () and  2 P ().
In this case, P = Pf and hence P () = f; ; g. Since L1 (a; ) = L1 (a; ) and
L2 (a; ) = L2 (a; ). Thus, Li (a;P ())  Li (a; ) for all i 2 f1; 2g but f () 6= f ().
Hence, f violates Maskin monotonicity for such P.
Case 2.  62 P () or  62 P ().
We derive a contradiction for  62 P () and the argument for the case with  62 P ()
is similar and so omitted. If  62 P (), then by Claim 1, we have Li (a;P ())  Li (a; )
for all i 2 f1; 2g. Then, f violates Maskin monotonicity for P since Li (a;P ())  Li (a; )
for all i 2 f1; 2g and  62 P ().
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Claim 3 The SCF f satises Maskin monotonicity:
Proof. This can be conrmed by observing that b 2 L1 (a; ) \ SU1 (a; ), c 2 L2 (a; ) \
SU2 (a; ), b 2 L1 (a; )\ SU1 (a; ), a 2 L1 (b; )\ SU1 (b; ), d 2 L2 (b; )\ SU2 (b; ), and
a 2 LA (b; ) \ SU1 (b; ) :
A.2 Direct Mechanism
Example 2 Suppose that there are two agents: f1; 2g; two states: f; g; and four pure
alternatives: fa; b; c; dg. Dene an SCF f such that f () = (a; 0; 0) and f () = (b; 0; 0).











Since d 2 L1(f(); )\SU1(f(); ) and c 2 L2(f(); )\SU2(f(); ), it follows that
f satises Maskin monotonicity. Hence, by Theorem 1, f is implementable in rationalizable
strategies by a nite (indirect) mechanism. A direct mechanismM = ((Mi)i2f1;2g; h) in this
environment has message space Mi = f; g and we denote its outcome and transfer rule
altogether by h = (g () ;  1 () ;  2 ()). To derive a contradiction, we hypothesize that f is
implementable in rationalizable strategies by a direct mechanism. Without loss of generality,
we assume that h (; ) = (a; 0; 0) and h (; ) = (b; 0; 0); moreover, (; ) 2 S1(M; ) and
(; ) 2 S1(M; ). Our argument is decomposed into the following three claims.
The rst claim states how to proceed the rst step of elimination of messages under
the hypothesis.
Claim 4 At state , message  is strictly dominated by message  for agent 1; moreover,
at state , message  is strictly dominated by message  for agent 2.
Proof. Note that h (; ) = (b; 0; 0). Since (b; 0; 0) is the best outcome for agent 2 at state
, there is no better outcome for agent 2 at state : Hence, it is a best response for agent 2 to
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report  given that agent 1 reports . Under our hypothesis of rationalizable implementation
by a direct mechanism, message  is strictly dominated by message  at state . A similar
argument proves the second part of the claim.
The next claim states that agent 1 is the only whistle-blower when (; ) is misreported
at state , and agent 2 is the only whistle-blower when (; ) is misreported at state ;
moreover, the common test allocation is h(; ).
Claim 5 h(; ) 2 SL1(f(); )\SU1(f(); ) and h(; ) 2 SL2(f(); )\SU2(f(); ).
Proof. By our hypothesis, (; ) is a rationalizable message prole at state  and (; )
is a rationalizable message prole at state . Moreover, (; ) cannot be a rationalizable
message prole at state  and (; ) cannot be a rationalizable message prole at state .
By Claim 4, it must be that at state ; agent 1 strictly prefers h(; ) to h (; ) and agent
2 strictly prefer h (; ) to h(; ): Similarly, at state ; agent 2 must strictly prefer h(; )
to h (; ) and agent 1 strictly prefers h (; ) to h(; ). Hence, we obtain Claim 5.
Claim 6 There are no direct mechanisms that implement f in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. Suppose we can achieve rationalizable implementation in a direct mechanism. Then,
by Claim 5, we have such an allocation h(; ); which in general can be a lottery over the four
pure alternatives as well as penalties. Let pa, pb, pc, and pd be the probabilities assigned over
the four alternatives induced by h(; ). By Claim 5, for agent 1; we obtain the following
inequalities:
h(; ) 2 SL1(f(); ), 3pa   pd +  1 (; ) < 0;
h(; ) 2 SU1(f(); ), 2pa   4pc + pd +  1 (; ) > 0.
Hence, we have 2pd   4pc > pa  0, which further implies that pd > 2pc.
For agent 2, we have the following inequalities:
h(; ) 2 SL2(f(); ), 3pb   pc +  2 (; ) < 0;
h(; ) 2 SU2(f(); ), 2pb + pc   4pd +  2 (; ) > 0.
Hence, we have 2pc   4pd > pb  0, which further implies that pc > 2pd. Therefore, we
obtain pd > 2pc > 4pd, which is a contradiction.
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